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Abstract
In "Bargaining to Lose: The Permeability Approach to Post Transition Resource Extraction" [1] Natasha Chichilnisky-Heal introduces an
original and fertile explanation for the resource curse.Her "permeability"
approach questions the treatment of the state is a decision maker having the public good as an objective, and replaces it by the results of a
bargaining game between the state and International organizations. Her
new theory is illustrated with unique hands-on experience in the case of
copper and gold mines in Mongolia and Zambia, and focuses on a bargaining game between the state and key …nancial organizations: the Bretton
Woods Institutions (IMF, World Bank) and MNCs. This piece extends
and generalizes "Bargaining to lose" providing economic models that validate the original conclusions, and exploring its implications for the global
commons: the atmosphere, the oceans and biodiversity. ChichilniskyHeal’s "permeable state" is a transition to a new globalized society where
the sovereign state - a relatively recent creation - is receding giving raise
to a new set of global economic agents and institutions that better explain the dynamics of the global commons. We show that the permeable
state complements other explanations for the resource curse [2] as a global
market failure magni…ed by globalization and based on the lack of well
de…ned property rights on natural resources during the pre-industrial period. We generalize Chichilnisky-Heal’s "bargaining to lose" approach to
the resource curse and explore its natural implications for the environmental crisis on the global commons.The solutions that Chichilnisky-Heal
proposes, e.g. limiting the Bretton Woods’ Institutions’ ‘seat at the negotiation table’ of resource extraction contracts, could help resolve the
environmental crisis that is based on over-extraction of global resources.
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Introduction

In "Bargaining to Lose: The Permeability Approach to Post Transition Resource Extraction" Natasha Chichilnisky-Heal [1] tackles the resource curse in
an original and fertile way. Her "permeability" approach questions the standard
treatment of the state as a single decision maker having the public good as an
objective. She o¤ers instead a new analytical and policy oriented methodology,
with hands-on experience in Mongolia and on Zambia, putting on the table
the state’s bargaining game with key global organizations. The state bargains
with the Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF, World Bank) and with MNCs in the
creation of contracts for exploiting the nations’ resource extraction; these are
the institutions that led the globalization of the world economy since the post
WWII period when colonialism receded and was replaced by market oriented international …nancial institutions. Chichilnisky-Heal argues that the developing
nation loses from the bargaining - and the loss is the resource curse.
This article extends Chichilnisky-Heal’s work in two directions: one, providing a mathematical model that formalize her arguments about the impact of
the state’s permeability on the exploitation of extractive resources and showing that the model validate her results; and two, showing that the resource
course takes a particular form: accelerating and increasing the quantities of resources extracted and lowering their prices in international markets. Through
Hotelling’s formalization of extractive resources as …nancial assets, it leads to
higher discount rates on the future, which in turn a¤ects negatively savings and
investment within resource rich GDP poor nations. The results link the resource
curse analysis of Chichilnisky-Heal with other work (Chichilnisky [2]) that views
the resource curse in developing nations as originating from the lack of private
property rights on resources in developing nations, and from the Bretton Woods’
institutions role in magnifying the corresponding tragedy of the commons into
the global environmental crisis of our time.
The resource curse explains the failure of resource rich developing nations to
use their resources as needed to achieve economic growth. It is highly applicable
today to poor nations. About 70% of the exports of Latin America today
are raw materials and that number is 90% in Africa. Ultimately the resource
curse impacts the entire global economy and underlies the global environmental
crisis. This crisis is based on the over-extraction of resources such as coal and
petroleum, causing dangerous CO2 emission levels, the biodiversity loss due
to over extraction of forest resources and overextraction of biomass from the
oceans. Most of the natural resources consumer in the world today are extracted
in poor nations (LA, Africa, post-transition economies) and they are extracted
for exports, leading to today’s over-consumption in the OECD world and to
worldwide environmental losses.
This piece explores the assumptions in "Bargaining to lose" comparing it
with the literature, and generalizes its results to explore its implications for
what is usually known as the global commons: the atmosphere, the oceans
and the planet’s biodiversity. The results address the following issues: (1)
whether Chichilnisky-Heal’s "permeable state" represents a transition to a new
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globalized society where the sovereign state - a relatively recent creation - is
receding giving rise to a new set of global economic agents and institutions that
better explains the dynamics of the global commons, (2) how the permeability
approach substitutes and complements other explanations for the resource curse
(Chichilnisky [2]) as a global market failure greatly magni…ed by globalization
and based on the lack of well de…ned property rights on natural resources in
poor nations during the pre-industrial period (3) provides an extension and
generalization of Chichilnisky-Heal’s "bargaining to lose" approach to enhance
the understanding of the environmental crisis on the global commons, and the
solutions that she proposes [1], e.g. limiting Bretton Woods Institutions’‘seat
at the negotiation table’ of resource extraction contracts, thus helping resolve
the environmental crisis based on over-extraction of global resources.
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The results

A simple mathematical model extend the original piece [?] under stereotyped
conditions that capture its key aspects, and establish the validity of its conclusions. Both models interpret in mathematical terms the excellent policy
examples and recommendations provided by Natasha Chichilnisky - Heal’s original article [1], as well as her game theoretical approach to a bargaining game
between the state and IFIs (International Financial Institutions). We establish
how the permeability of the state causes inferior outcomes in terms of undermining the nation’s economic growth and inducing poverty. Within this simpli…ed
framework the model expands on Natasha’s piece by showing how the resource
curse causes environmental degradation by generally leading to overextraction
of extractive resources in developing nations. The oversupply of resources leads
to prices that are lower than would be optimal without the permeable state,
ultimately inducing overconsumption in the industrial nations as well as global
loss of biodiversity, overexploitation of the oceans, and overemission of CO2 into
the atmosphere..
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The "permeable" state: a formal economic
model

The model and their results are presented in a summarized form as appropriate
for the October 23rd Yale conference. It formalizes the "permeability" approach
by de…ning a continous parameter with values between 0 and 1 that measures
the extent of "weakened sovereignity" by the state - this is the methodology
proposed in [1]. The model studies the optimal intertemporal allocation problem
of a developing nation that extracts natural resource, such as for example the
optimal exploitation of the largest copper-gold mine in the world that is located
in the Gobi Desert Mongolia. The results show that there is overextraction
in the short run and a lowering of the prices, due to the permeability of the
state. In a permeable state, the intertemporal allocation in the developing
3

nation is compromised and becomes suboptimal, undermining economic growth
and producing poverty while the nation increases its extraction and exports of
resources. This is the resource curse that Chichilnisky-Heal focused on in her
original piece. The parameter that measures permeability of the state can
be interpreted as the degreee of control by the state of its resources, including
the state’s ability to exercise property rights on the nation’s territory and on its
extractive resources, where = 1 implies full control and = 0 implies complete
loss of control or lack of property rights - such as, for example, during the period
of colonization This formulation follows the approach suggested to a continuum
of degrees of permeability as indicated in Chichilnisky-Heal’s original piece [1].
Within this formulation we compare the intertemporal allocation of resources
that occurs when the parameter = 1 and when < 1:The state negotiates a
contract with a MNC for extraction of resources as explained in the original piece
[1] - and the model shows how a low amount of control, namely a lower value
of the parameter , leads to ine¢ cient intertemporal allocation of resources.
In particular it leads to the overextraction of resources that are o¤ered to the
export markets at prices that are lower than would be optimal when = 1 and
there is no permeability. The result is that the developing nation overextracts
its resources, and that extractive resources are excessively exported, traded in
international markets, and thus undervalued. This in turn produces a negative
e¤ect on the nation’s economy, leading to poverty and to suboptimal economic
growth. It also leads to negative e¤ects on the world as a whole, a massive
overconsumption of extractive resources. The former is the "resource curse"
and the latter is the origin of the environmental crisis in the world economy.
Therefore we thus …nd an explanation based on the "permeability approach,"
for the resource curse and the global environmental crisis. The environmental
crisis includes for example the overextraction of trees from developing nations’
forests leading to biodiversity destruction and destruction of carbon sinks that
recycle the world’s carbon, as well as the overextraction of petroleum and coal
leading to increased CO2 emissions and therefore to climate change.
The model we propose for the bargaining between the state and the ICIs. is
based on contract theory and emerges from the original Chichilnisky-Heal piece
[?]. It explains the process by which a developing nation negotiates a contract
with a MNC - such as Rio Tinto and the Mongolian government in the example
of the copper and gold mine in Mongolia - with the participation of the World
Bank as a third party that participates in the process. In the example of [1] after
…ve years of World Bank recommendations in favor of an (unfavorable) contract
with Rio Tinto the person who led the World Bank team joined Rio Tinto in
a senior role once the contract was signed by the Mongolian government, see
[1]. We show that "hidden contracts" - which are typical in contract theory –
can emerge in this context, and use the policy example in Chichilnisky-Heal to
illustrate with a real world case study. Hidden contracts are known to cause
inferior outcomes in terms of the allocation of resources in the developing nation,
once again explaining the resource curse as originating from the permeability of
the state, as Natasha set out to do in her original piece. This contract model is
not presented formallly here and will be developed mathematically elsewhere.
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Permeability, the Resource Curse and the Global
Environment

This section examines the intertemporal allocation of resources in a nation with
a permeable state. A sovereign nation N has a total amount M of an extractive
resource such as gold, copper, coal, a forest, or a …shery. Developing nations
typically lack private property rights for natural resources, which can be either
treated as common or a free access asset or may be owned by the government,
for a discussion see [2]. This is di¤erent forr developed nations such as USA
and Australia, where resources are typically privately owned. As examples of
developingn nations, consider Zambia and its copper mines, Mongolia and its
Gobi Dessert’s Gold-Copper mines that are the largest in the world, Brazil and
it rainforests, and Nigeria and Mexico and their petroleum. In these cases the
resource is either owned by the government, or in the case of Brazil the resource
(the Amazon forest) is often used as a common or free access property. In all
cases, there are no well de…ned private property rights. This dichotomy between
indusrial and developing nations along the lines of property rights on resources
was observed in Chichilnisky [2]. In industrial nations where natural resources
are often privately owned such as the US and its EXXON-Mobile petroleum,
Australia and Rio Tinto, Canada and its tar sands.
Focus therefore on a developing nation N: Lacking private property rights,
the role of N 0s sovereign state is to optimize over time the extraction and sale
of M , and to do so optimally for the welfare of its citizens. In general terms the
value of the resource to the nation N can be represented as
V (M )
where V represents welfare that the nation N can obtain from exploiting extracting, producing exporting and selling - the resource stock M .
This section will o¤er a very simple economic model that validates in standard economic terms the results in Chichilnisky-Heal on how the permeability of
the state in N diminishes the optimal value the nation can achieve from its extractive resource. It shows how the nation ends up overextracting the resource in
the short run with respect to the what would be an optimal pattern of resource
extraction over time. This in turn causes lower resource prices when the nation
has an impact on global markets - for example in the case on Mongolia, who has
the largest copper and gold mines in the world in its Gobi Desert. In the context
of nation N , the loss of welfare and the economic economic losses produced by
the misallocation of its extractive resources undermines economic performance
and can be called the resource curse. Obviously there may be other contributing
factors, but this model su¢ ces to indicate the extent to which the permeability
of the state inevitably leads to the misallocation of economic resources.
The following is a simple intertemporal allocation model for nation N: From
the above, the optimal intertemporal allocation problem of N can be simply
summarized as the following optimal resource extraction problem over time:
V (M ) = M axx (x + V (M
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x))

where M is the total amount of the resource in N , x is the amount extracted
in the …rst period, is a time discount factor indicating the value to the nation of
increasing value today rather than tomorrow, and V (M x) represents the value
from extracting the remaining stock after x is extracted today. As famously
indicated by Hotelling, an extractive resource can be considered a …nancial asset,
so that its optimal allocation has to take into consideration the …nancial gains
of extracting today and investing the money in …nancial markets, obtaining a
…nancial rate of return r. The extraction plan must re‡ect N 0s indi¤erence
between a dollar from extraction today and a dollar times (1 + r) tomorrow.
Therefore satis…es the equation
=

1
1+r

where r is the …nancial return that can be obtained from extracting the resource
and investing the money in a …nancial institution. The optimality condition is
therefore
1 = V 0 (M x)
where V 0 is the derivative of V with respect to x: So far this represents in a
highly simpli…ed form the optimal extraction plan for nation N:over time.
Now introduce the "permeability factor" that is de…ned in [1] as discussed
above. In that case the optimization problem changes to
V (M ) = M axx (x +

V (M

x))

where the parameter represents the degree of permeability as de…ned in [1] and
described above. The degreee of permeability is between 0 and 1; i:e: 2 [0; 1]:
When the state is permeable, for any …rm that exploits the resource, the value
of the second period of the contract is more uncertain, since the state cannot
fully ensure a future contract for extracting the resource. The extent of this
uncertainty varies with the permeability parameter, between 0 and 1, with 0
representing no property rights by the state and 1 representing full control.
This decreases the …rm’s economic value of a contract for extraction in period
2 with respect to the value of extraction in period 1. The loss of certainty
is represented here by multipying the second term by the parameter : We
therefore have the new modi…ed optimality condition:
V (M ) = M axx (x +

V (M

x))

where V (M ) represents the optimal welfate that can be obtained under the
permeability approach with permeability factor .
Proposition 1: When the state is permeable,any …rm that exploits the
resourcefaces an uncertain future about its contract. The extent of this uncertainty varies with the permeability parameter and more permeability decreases
further the …rm’s economic value of a contract for extraction in period 2 with
respect to the value of extraction in period 1. The result is acceleration and
magni…cation of extraction today, and a corresponding lowering of resource
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prices in international markets, leading to the resource curse. The larger is the
permeability, the larger is the ine¢ ciency.
Proof: The loss of certainty is represented here by multipying the second
term by the parameter : We therefore have the new modi…ed optimality condition:
V (M ) = M axx (x + V (M x))
where V (M ) represents the optimal welfare that can be obtained under the
permeability approach with permeability factor . Since 2 [0; 1] we have the
following inequality:
V (M )

= M axx (x +
<

V (M

V (M ) = M axx (x +

x))
V (M

x))

so when the state is permeable, namely < 1, the welfare of N decreases with
the permeability of the state while extraction in the …rst period x increases,
in particular with a permeable state the extraction today increases over what
is optimal leading to lower international prices for the resource. Recall the
example of Mongolia, whose copper and gold mines in the Gobi desert are the
largest in the world:
x >x
This completes the proof..
Proposition 2: Permeability leads to higher discount factors in …nancial
markets and to lower rates of savings and investment in a developing nation
that would be optimal.
Proof: This follows directly from Hotelling’s observation that extractive resources are equivalent to …nancial assets, and from the fact that more permeability is equivalent to a higher discount factor for the future..
Proposition 3: Permeability leads to global over extraction of resources
and to lower resource prices. The overextraction in developing nations and
overconsumption in OECD nations causes the global environmental crisis in the
Global Commons: Overuse of the atmosphere (over consumption of fossil fuels
as extractive resources), the Oceans (overextraction of biomass from the oceans)
and Biodiversity extinction (overextraction of forests, destruction of ecosystem
and landscapes).
Proof: This follows from Propositions 1 and 2, see also Chichilnisky [2]
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